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Order and Creativity in Virtual Worlds
By Evan W Osborne & Shu Z Schiller, Wright State University

Abstract
Economies are driven by dynamic creativity, but some sorts of creativity,
especially if predatory, can destroy an economy. This tradeoff has been known for
centuries to political philosophers who have analyzed physical space, but it has not
been addressed in virtual space. Like physical economies, virtual economies face
the tradeoff of encouraging freedom to experiment, while discouraging experiments
that damage society. Physical societies solve this problem both through encouraging
competition and by giving government the unique power to punish destructive
activities. In virtual societies, this tradeoff has yet to be adequately assessed. Guided
by the economic modeling of order and creativity, in this paper we discuss two types
of behavior, constructive and destructive, to provide some guidelines for establishing
limitations on the freedom of action of virtual-economy participants.
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Order and Creativity in Virtual Worlds
By Evan W Osborne & Shu Z Schiller, Wright State University

In his masterwork Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes writes:
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the
invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as
that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of
men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to
say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own and
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or
cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to
submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements to his judgement. This is more than
consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant
of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I
authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on
this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner.
This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH. (Hobbes,
1972, p. 227).
The problem of how to organize social authority has preoccupied many of the greatest
social thinkers in cultures around the world for thousands of years. Throughout most of this
history, the creation of a new society was a matter either for abstract models of societies founded
in a state of nature or a question for historians investigating societies from the past. We could
look into the results of a society’s founding or we could create an abstract conception of what its
founding might have been like, but we could seldom observe the creation of a new society.
But thanks to modern information technology, we now can. People around the world
now routinely create self-contained societies, importing all the features of the human condition
from outside – conflict, commerce, loyalty, betrayal, and more. Such societies are created on the
platform of the internet, which has the ability to bring many people together regardless of their
physical locations. New technologies, including the much increased bandwidth and speed of the
internet and powerful computer systems, have now enabled the creation of much more
sophisticated online societies, including virtual worlds.
Virtual worlds can be defined as technology-created 3-D, graphically detailed, and highly
interactive environments that incorporate representations of real world elements such as human
beings, landscapes, and other objects (Kock, 2008). People participate or “live” in virtual worlds
in the form of their avatars, a digital representation of an individual in either human or nonhuman form. As of 2007, there were more than 100 virtual worlds on the internet, taking various
forms and with different purposes (Barnes, 2007). Our study focuses on “real virtual worlds”

4

Journal of Virtual Worlds Research - Order and Creativity in VWs 5

such as Second Life that feature the 3-D3C factors (3-D, community, creation, commerce)
defined by Sivan (2008),1 as opposed to gaming societies such as World of Warcraft (WoW).
Commerce is a substantial component of and catalyst for human activities in these virtual
worlds. Buying and selling in virtual currency is very common and often encouraged. For
instance, in the first quarter of 2009 in Second Life, resident-to-resident transactions reached
$120 million (that number acquired from Second Life’s official blog at
https://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2009/04/16/the-second-life-economy-first-quarter-2009-in-detail). In addition, many virtual worlds are peer-created communities
where people can build, give away, sell, or trade items with any other resident, just as with
property (intellectual or otherwise) in physical space.
But despite their technological trappings, these societies are made up of humans who
bring their virtues and flaws with them. The question of how to order a virtual society is in many
respects similar to its physical-world equivalent. This topic has never been explored in depth in
the information-systems literature. Given the popularity of virtual worlds and their promising
role in practice, it is critical to understand the mechanisms of these self-sustaining societies. We
believe that the study of governance in physical space can benefit from thinking about how it
occurs in virtual space and vice versa. Taking an economic perspective and confining our
attention to theory rather than empirical analysis, in this paper we focus on one particular
question – that of the proper tradeoff between order and creativity. The insights provide a useful
complement to Duranske (2008), who focuses on the implementation of physical-world law,
itself shaped by centuries of political theory in virtual space. Here, in contrast, we are interested
in whether that theory may suggest the development of different principles for governance in
virtual worlds. We are making a positive argument rather than a normative one, so that when we
speak of what virtual-world owners “should” do, the argument is made with respect to the needs
of profit maximization. We begin by setting out the key issues in Sections 2-4 before
investigating in Sections 5-8 the ways in which governance in virtual space, because of its
differences from physical space, is likely to be correspondingly different.
Order and Disorder

The question of the proper balance of order and liberty is an ancient one. Hobbes
depicted the state of nature absent government as a war of all against all and took the side of
order by arguing that the state must be given absolute power to maintain it. For others, such as
Locke (1986) or Bastiat (1996), the state itself is not to be trusted with excessive power because
that power will be used in destructive ways. It is possible, if not inevitable, that even wellintentioned rules will create unintended consequences that the rule-drafters did not predict,
which induce the rulemakers to react with ever-more complicated rules in a futile attempt to
achieve the desired outcome, at tremendous consequence to both individual autonomy and social
viability. The source of this problem, as the economist Friedrich von Hayek (1994) noted, is that
planners know so little about the details of the world they govern that their clumsy rules
inevitably cause people to react in unexpected ways, frustrating the planners’ goals. The need to
1

Teen Second Life is restricted to teens aged 13-17. Its highly restrictive and protective policies and unique profiles
of its users make it a special case not generally relevant here.

5

Journal of Virtual Worlds Research - Order and Creativity in VWs 6

conform to or the cost of evading the planners’ rules means that creative activity by individuals
in possession of knowledge about particular opportunities, knowledge that is invisible to the
planner, is stifled. In the limit, this ever-increasing control culminates in the catastrophe of
totalitarianism. Thus, while a Hobbes might assert the need for a powerful state to prevent
predatory behavior, a Hayek would emphasize the destructive effects of state control on
individual freedom and creativity. There is therefore a compelling tradeoff between the order
paradoxically necessary to enable creativity and the power that destroys it.
This tradeoff exists within the specific realm of economic creativity as well. On one
hand an agent needs the freedom to experiment – to create a new business (or other social
experiment) without restraint. A controlling authority, even a well-intentioned one, may impose
so many rules on starting entrepreneurial ventures and on how they are run once they are
established, that business costs will be cripplingly high. Fewer activities, even potentially
promising ones, are undertaken, and society is poorer and less dynamic. On the other hand, the
entrepreneur requires enforced order to a degree – his property rights must be protected, she must
have a court system so that the contracts she enters into can be enforced, and so forth. He may
even benefit if the government enforces various kinds of protections against unintentional harm,
so that his customers have the confidence to do business with him.
Production and Destruction
These are the problems that governments in physical space face all the time. And in
virtual worlds they are fundamentally the same, though different in some of the particulars.
Some virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft and the Sims are purely gaming environments,
while others, such as Second Life and Active Worlds, are developed for entertainment and
commercial purposes (virtual commerce or virtual business). We focus here on these latter types
of societies.
Such virtual worlds, which are as full of commercial activity as any physical society,
allow users considerably more creative freedom than games. There are no pre-plotted scenarios,
avatars do not normally die or lose their lives, and as noted above, these virtual worlds allow
creation of content by their residents who, subject to modest limitations, own the intellectual
property rights to it. They are worlds in which individuals choose their pattern of interaction,
with (in contrast to physical space) few institutional and geographic constraints written into the
code by the worlds’ creators. Like human society in physical space, such worlds are
unpredictable and constantly evolving – they become whatever the users collectively build. For
instance, in Second Life, all content is created by its users except for some standard objects
provided in the default library repository of “structures.” The ability to create in this way in
virtual worlds, and the value such creativity has to users, is the fundamental reason why
governance, which can excessively or insufficiently restrict individual creativity, is a balancing
act. In virtual worlds, too little creativity limits peer-creation activities and thus makes a world
uninteresting and therefore unprofitable, while too much makes it unpleasant or dangerous to the
avatars who use it because they are victims of other avatars, either by design or accident.
It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of activity: productive and destructive.
Productive activity, through voluntary cooperation with other actors, leaves all who choose to
work together better off – in physical space, such profit or not-for-profit activities as opening and
operating businesses, or creating new cooperative social institutions such as a Boy Scout troop or
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a bowling league. Destructive activity leaves at least one participant in the activity worse off.2
And there are two varieties of destructive behavior – intentional and unintentional. Intentionally
destructive (ID) behavior has the goal of forcibly limiting others’ options, often by trying to seize
their wealth – robbery, war, lobbying the government for special benefits unwillingly or
unwittingly funded by other taxpayers, and others. Unintentionally destructive (UD) activities
make someone worse off if certain contingencies happen, even though a seller may have
(perhaps unreasonably) expected they would not. For example, in the physical world, selling
medicine the seller knows to be ineffective but claims is safe is ID, selling food with ingredients
purchased from the lowest-cost supplier despite their being subject to poor quality control may
be UD, although from the buyer’s point of view the effects are the same. Similarly, ID and UD
activities are seen in virtual worlds. Examples of ID behavior there include a “griefer” assaulting
another avatar (a concept clearly analogous to physical-world assault) or the coding of malicious
scripts into seemingly benign objects such as a bouquet of roses. On the other hand, virtual
banks may fail, taking the savings of participants with them, a form of UD behavior – the bank
was not founded with the intent of destroying savers’ deposits. This exact phenomenon led to a
decision by Linden Labs in January 2008 to prohibit any business from offering “interest or any
direct return on an investment,” a decision we discuss further below.
The trick for the designer of a virtual world is how to maximize the welfare of its
residents knowing that some residents will engage in either variety of destructive behavior.
Modeling the Order-Creativity Tradeoff
A way of thinking about the problem is to imagine first that a (physical or virtual)
world’s governing authority has the choice of two regulatory regimes, High or Low. In a Low
regulatory regime, there are no limits on individual freedom, while in a High regulatory regime,
many activities are prohibited or regulated in the name of order. Assume that the world has two
agents (agents 1 and 2), who have the choice of devoting their resources to constructive, ID or
UD activity. Figures 1 and 2 show potential distributions of income among the two agents in an
economy. The curves AA’ and BB’ in Figures 1 and 2 represent two levels of potential income
distribution among the two agents (“income” is used in its broadest economic sense – not just the
proceeds of salaried labor, but the returns to providing any good or service that is valuable to
someone else). The curves represent the Pareto frontiers of each economy – the set of all
combinations of income x1 and x2 that make it impossible to make either agent better off without
making the other worse off, the standard economic definition of efficient operation of an
economy.
Note that this definition of efficiency makes no statement about the desirability of a
particular distribution of income. At point A, for example, agent 2 has all the income while

2

Note that effective competition is not intentionally destructive activity. While it may make other competitors
worse off, they have the opportunity to choose to compete on terms that their customers prefer but choose not to.
The gains from competition to participants in exchange (including successful competitors) exceed, by the first
theorem of welfare economics (Varian, 1992), the losses to the non-participants who fail to win customers. This is
why, in the Anglo-American legal system, competition is not a tort (Posner, 2007). Note also that the notion of
destructive behavior here is static, and is unrelated to Schumpeter’s (2008) concept of “creative destruction,”
referring to the continuous dynamic remaking of an economy through entrepreneurial activity. Such activity will
exist in virtual worlds as surely as in physical space, and is as beneficial there.
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agent 1 has none, and there is no way to make 1 better off without making 2 worse off. But the
usefulness of this concept of efficiency is that it allows us to say clearly that starting from any
point in the interior of the curve, at point a, for instance, there are points to the northeast, moving
toward the frontier, that are superior because they make both agents better off. The closer the
particular combination of incomes is to the frontier, the more efficient the economy is.
This concept of efficiency also allows illustration of the costs of destructive activity.
Destructive activity moves us further away from the frontier. Suppose agent 2 grows food, and
agent 1 makes clothes. If it is relatively easy for each agent to steal the produce of the other,
then some of the resources otherwise devoted to producing food and clothing are instead devoted
to protecting their crops and clothes from theft by the other agent – by buying weapons and
building walls, for example. If theft is sufficiently lucrative, 1 and 2 devote so many resources to
stealing (instead of concentrating on production) and defending their property against theft by
the other agent that much less food and clothing are produced. But if the ruling authority can
effectively enforce punishment against theft, making it more costly, agents 1 and 2 have an
incentive to produce more and steal less, moving them from point a in the northeast direction,
toward the frontier, within the dotted lines in the figure. In the limit, if enforcement against theft
is perfect, 1 and 2 will end up on the frontier, somewhere (depending on the relative productivity
of each agent) in the bolded section of the curve.
What differentiates AA’ and BB’ is that in the economy subject to productive
possibilities BB’ there are more restrictions on the ability of participants to engage in different
kinds of activities. In the economy with potential production AA’ agents are free, for example,
to start virtual banks without obtaining a license from the world’s authorities (or without being
required to participate in a mandatory deposit-insurance program, the analogue of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation in physical space), or in physical space to use ingredients that
have not passed government safety inspections, and so forth. If in a virtual world the banks are
solvent or a partner’s code is non-malicious, or if in a physical world the food ingredients are
safe, then actual income will be somewhere along AA’, which usually exceeds the outcomes
along BB’, in which various regulations of individual creative freedom do exist. AA’ is a world
with more potential income, because the government does not limit the ability of the farmer and
the clothier through costly regulations.
But potential income is not the same as actual income. Potential income is eroded by
both types of destructive behavior. The theft of clothing, or the selling of tainted food, means
that the actual outcome will be below the frontiers, at point a (with incomes x1A and x2A) in the
Low world and point b (with incomes x1B and x2B) in the High one. The frontier BB’ represents
a society that tries to control this loss through regulation. It is a function of such regulation to
limit the movement below the curve, while keeping the curve itself as high as possible, but such
regulation means that potential income, because of compliance and enforcement costs, is less, so
that BB’ lies inside AA’. A less regulated economy, in other words, raises potential income but
may or may not raise actual income for each agent. While AA’ and BB’ thus represent the set of
potential incomes for each agent – i.e., the set of possible outcomes if there is no destructive
activity – the distances between a and AA’ in the Low world and between BB’ and b in the High
world each represent the loss of income due to destructive activity in that world.

8

Journal of Virtual Worlds Research - Order and Creativity in VWs 9

Figure 1. A world where more freedom is preferable.

Figure 2. A world where less freedom is preferable.

In Figure 1, actual income in the Low world (low regulation) at a is higher for both
agents than at b in the High world (high regulation). But in Figure 2, the losses from destructive
activity are so great without high regulation that the actual income for each party in the Low
world is much closer to the origin and considerably worse than the outcome with a High regime.
In this case, substantial limits on social experimentation are justified despite their negative
effects on potential income. The simple model illustrates the classic argument between those
who believe in strict law enforcement and enforcement of traditional cultural patterns and those
who believe in a more liberal approach in the pursuit of progress (for more analysis, see Raeder,
1997).
Intentionally Destructive (Id) Behavior
The question of interest becomes whether virtual worlds, compared to the physical one,
are better served by a Low or High regime. There is no way to answer for certain, but the model
suggests some guiding principles. First, ID activity should generally be policed to the extent
possible. The model indicates that all ID activity moves the participants in any virtual world
away from the Pareto frontier. It is true that entrepreneurs in response to extensive griefing may
develop anti-griefer tools, which generates wealth for them and (critically, taking for granted the
existence of this amount of griefing) for the purchasers of their products. But it is still true that
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griefers are on balance wealth-destroying, for the same reason that burglary is wealth-destroying
despite the fact that it generates a demand for burglar bars or that breaking windows is wealthdestroying despite the fact that it generates demand for window-repair services. It is wise for
virtual worlds to police purely predatory activity to the extent the technology allows. So-called
“griefers” mimic physical-world vandalism, assault, and homicide, and (also in imitation of
physical-world behavior) frequently do it through organized gangs, with command structures,
division of labor and meticulous planning. Their efforts are often profoundly resented by other
virtual world users. This is why firms such as Linden Labs take them so seriously. Dibbell
(2008) offers an account of the constant war between griefers, their victims, and the owners of
virtual worlds.
In fact, virtual worlds often use tiered freedom to limit potential ID behavior. For
instance, an island owner can make his island open to anyone, or private, limited to those with
permission to enter. If an avatar behaves badly on a private island, the owner can ban the avatar
from coming, temporarily, or permanently. Another type of restriction can be imposed on
avatars through group affiliations and titles. A group owner is given the right by an island owner
to recruit new group members and to give them different classifications, such as member or
guest. A guest group member might not be able to view certain content or obtain certain items
created by the group members. Such a tiered structure is a way to control ID behavior in virtual
worlds, and is similar to management of property in physical space – the bar manager, for
example, who is empowered by the owner to expel a disruptive customer.
Constant vigilance against such actions will be a requirement for the success of virtual
worlds, all the more so because of the ease with which people can exit virtual as opposed to
physical-world societies. Migration among virtual worlds is a little-studied phenomenon,
although Castronova (2008) has discussed migration of human activities from physical to virtual
space. If a resident of a country in physical space is threatened by widespread violence, her
options are sometimes limited to self-defense rather than migration. She may hire security
guards or place defense mechanisms in her home, but the high degree of society-specific
investments she has made in herself (mastering the local language rather than a foreign one,
understanding local business culture but not that of a foreign land) combined with the cost of
uprooting her household and moving to a foreign land make migration comparatively difficult.
Movement from one virtual world plagued by ID behavior to another where it is much better
controlled is, in contrast, a relatively simple act. The control of ID behavior is therefore likely to
be a key requirement of successful virtual worlds. The user who in one society must constantly
defend his avatar or island is likely to strongly prefer the world where the world’s creator instead
effectively does this job for him, just as individuals in physical space prefer societies with law
and order to those where they must rely primarily on themselves for defense.
Unintentionally Destructive (Ud) Behavior and the Value of Experiential Variety
The challenge arises with UD behavior. Should the attitude of the owners of a virtual
world, absent the intention to defraud (fraud being ID behavior), be one of caveat emptor? Or
should they maximize the freedom to experiment by their participants, even at the cost of more
UD activity?
An answer to this question is suggested by the role of variety in virtual worlds. We
believe that the primary attraction of virtual worlds for the consumer is their astonishing variety
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and creativity. Variety in physical space is valuable to consumers, though only up to a point.
Consumers like to have more kinds of cars to choose from, but too many choices can become
paralyzing, as recent research suggests (Botti & Iyengar, 2006). But in virtual worlds diversity
of experience is often the goal itself. The proper comparison for the value of variety in virtualworld design is not to a consumer having difficulty choosing from among several dozen different
kinds of toothpaste, but to a person who enjoys traveling and wants to visit as many countries as
possible. A facilitator of variety in virtual worlds is their low-cost material and resources.
Players or avatars are able to obtain many items for free or build them with very low investment.
For instance, a collector may be able to obtain a copy of a virtual racing car for free in Second
Life, compared to paying large amounts of money for an actual or even replica car in the
physical world. Such low costs foster the exchange of goods and increase the value of variety in
virtual worlds.
The role of diversity in virtual worlds has been explored before. Castronova (2006)
invokes the economic model of club goods to describe virtual worlds. A club good is a good that
is public, in that benefits can be provided simultaneously to many members but is also subject to
crowding costs when too many people use it simultaneously. More participants can be better for
the user because more variety makes the product more enjoyable, but too many participants
make the club undesirable, for search-cost (it is too difficult to find a good trading partner) or
infrastructure-cost reasons. A country club with too few members is one where opportunities to
socialize are limited, but a club with too many members is one where it is difficult to reserve
time on the golf course, because building enough courses to accommodate so many users with
reasonable waiting times would be prohibitively expensive. The former effects are known as
network effects, in which the bigger the network of participants, the greater the opportunity for
valuable exchange and interaction. The latter effects are crowding costs, the difficulties that
arise, either from search costs or overuse of the club’s resources, from too many members.
Castronova argues that as the number of participants increases from zero, virtual worlds benefit
from having more players for a time, but crowding costs eventually mean that adding players
makes the world less desirable. Note that the crowding costs are not simply the claim on
computer time from more users, which can be addressed by the purchase of more processing
power and memory, but the actual occupation of virtual space by avatars – the problem, to
borrow from the baseball player Yogi Berra’s famous remark, of the island that is so crowded
that no one goes there anymore.
But we believe that in the worlds under study here the network effect will dominate.
While games built around specific achievements and experiences – combat games, for example –
may quickly be subject to crowding, games built around social interaction are much less so. For
such worlds the variety of potential experiences cannot help but make the experience more
attractive, subject to two qualifications. First, the interactions must be primarily productive
rather than destructive. Few if any residents participate in virtual worlds in search of more
variety in assault by griefers. Second, there must be a technology making it easy to seek out new
experiences and to store and retrieve enjoyable ones. If these conditions are met, interaction in a
virtual world is not like consumption of such physical objects as cars or food, where decisions
are often driven either by a desire for durability or by habit. While an observer just arriving from
another planet might marvel at the dozens of breakfast cereals that the consumer in a typical
supermarket has to choose from, the average consumer chooses relatively few of them over time.
In part this is a function of the quality provided by known brands – a consumer may not wish to
risk low quality from a producer he does not know and thus continues to consume the same
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brand rather than be adventurous and try another. In addition, many physical products are not
bought often enough for variety to be a compelling trait compared to reliability. But in a virtual
world like Second Life, visiting many different islands is key to the attractiveness of the
experience.
Variety is costly to manufacture, but this effect is much more dramatic in physical than in
virtual space. Often producing new varieties of physical-world products is costly, requiring a
multitude of resources unnecessary in the virtual world, such as electric power, manufacturing
equipment, advertising slots, etc. These resources are much more meaningfully scarce than
creativity , which is, because of the low cost of computer processing and storage, the key
ingredient in virtual worlds.. Recalling that ID behavior, no matter how creative, should always
be controlled, what makes UD behavior problematic in physical space is that competition is
relatively ineffective as a remedy. But because of the ease of producing variety, competition is
more powerful in virtual space than in physical, and thus it is more likely that the losses to UD
behavior in a Low world (low regulation) will be outweighed by the much greater potential
income. Part of the reason that a bank failure is more problematic in physical than virtual space
is that there are relatively few banks in the former, because banks are difficult to start there.
Banks in physical space are less limited by this constraint and the fact that it is easier to start one
suggests erring on the side of creativity rather than regulation. It is true that Linden Labs recently
took the extreme step of banning such financial institutions, but we wonder whether such a
response is excessive. It is undoubtedly true that some perhaps significant portion of banking
activity in Second Life, as with any kind of economic activity anywhere, was ID. But while ID
behavior can and probably should be prohibited (e.g., by banning banking fraud in a virtual
world), this does not indicate that an entire economically useful activity should be banned. Such
a recognition of the power in virtual worlds of constructive activity is all the true if (as seems
likely, since it is so frequent in physical space, where the costs are higher) people in virtual space
develop systems for rating the quality of various services (e.g., banks) offered there.
This effect is even more enhanced by the non-arbitrary dictatorship that is likely to
prevail in most virtual worlds. In physical space, governance occurs through both more
dictatorial and more consensual systems. It is not obvious that a non-consensual ruler, such as a
hereditary monarch rather than an elected president, is intrinsically hostile to human happiness.
The key issue is not the fact that a dictator is a dictator, but what it is he dictates. If rule is by
ironclad custom or otherwise made predictable and non-arbitrary, citizens may still be free to
pursue their interests. Dictatorial rule that nonetheless leaves substantial room for individual
autonomy within expansive limits, such as took place in nineteenth-century Austria-Hungary or
in British-ruled East Asia (Sowell, 1994), might be preferable to democratic societies where the
rules – who is permitted to do what, what government services are provided, and who pays for
them – oscillate wildly from one government to the next. And virtual worlds are dictatorships,
but profit-maximizing ones. The owners set the rules for interaction and social experimentation,
but everyone knows what the rules are and knows they are likely to be stable because ownership
of the rulemaking power will not change much, and because the ruler’s goals – profit
maximization – are transparent. Political instability – that is, instability in what the rules for
social experimentation and interaction are – is a major deterrent to creative activity. Worlds run
strictly for profit may have rules that differ substantially from those in physical space, but they
will nonetheless be stable, and hence will lend themselves to more creative experimentation.
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In short, in virtual space both demand and supply favor the creation of variety. Less
regulation of activity that might be UD allows for more activity that will in the end be
constructive, while the losses to UD activities are also minimized relative to physical space by
the features of virtual space. Note finally, however, that these arguments are less compelling in
the case of virtual worlds designed for the young, where variety that is constructive for adults
may be destructive, sometimes even intentionally so, for children.
An Example of Facilitating Constructive Activity in Virtual Space –
Intellectual-Property Rules
To summarize, controlling ID activity enhances wealth, but regulating UD activities
increases the cost of constructive activity. We believe that virtual worlds will (and should)
ultimately be characterized by the promotion of such constructive behavior by taking advantage
of opportunities to improve upon arrangements that are inevitably problematic in physical space.
Some confirmation of the tilt toward creativity and against restricting it can be found in the
intellectual-property rules of Second Life. Note first that intellectual-property protection,
particularly copyrights and patents, is in physical space a tradeoff. The granting of a copyright
or patent is legal recognition of a monopoly right. Monopolies charge higher prices and produce
less compared to a competitive market, and so this monopoly grant is costly. However, if
innovations are costly to create but cheap to copy once someone else has incurred this cost, the
incentive to create without intellectual-property protection is severely diminished. To see how
these issues are handled in virtual space, consider excerpts below from the user agreement of
Second Life:
Users of the Service can create Content on Linden Lab's servers in various forms.
Linden Lab acknowledges and agrees that, subject to the terms and conditions of
this Agreement, you will retain any and all applicable copyright and other
intellectual property rights with respect to any Content you create using the
Service, to the extent you have such rights under applicable law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, you understand and agree that by submitting your
Content to any area of the service, you automatically grant (and you represent and
warrant that you have the right to grant) to Linden Lab: (a) a royalty-free,
worldwide, fully paid-up, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive right and license
to (i) use, reproduce and distribute your Content within the Service as permitted
by you through your interactions on the Service, and (ii) use and reproduce (and
to authorize third parties to use and reproduce) any of your Content in any or all
media for marketing and/or promotional purposes in connection with the Service.
You also understand and agree that by submitting your Content to any area of the
Service, you automatically grant (or you warrant that the owner of such Content
has expressly granted) to Linden Lab and to all other users of the Service a nonexclusive, worldwide, fully paid-up, transferable, irrevocable, royalty-free and
perpetual License, under any and all patent rights you may have or obtain with
respect to your Content, to use your Content for all purposes within the Service.
You further agree that you will not make any claims against Linden Lab or
against other users of the Service based on any allegations that any activities by
either of the foregoing within the Service infringe your (or anyone else's) patent
rights.
13
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The first feature of the agreement worth noting is that in any virtual world, physicalworld copyright law does not cease to hold. Anyone who writes a song and incorporates it onto
her island in a virtual world still holds all legal rights to the song that she possesses in physical
space in her country. Whether copyright can be meaningfully enforced in virtual space,
particularly given that companies may incorporate anywhere and the identities of those who
appropriate copyrighted material may be harder to trace, is a separate question.
But apart from these exceptions, Second Life allows any resident to click on an object
and learn the rules on distribution and modification that the creator has attached to it. That the
creator can define such rights so easily is the key point. Avatars in Second Life have the ability
to create almost any digital content – a table, a tree, a store, or even a whole city. Such content is
owned by the creators, who can make copies of, sell, or give it away. For instance, the
popularity of fashions for avatars has led many people to open fashion stores in Second Life.
Clothes, accessories, and even body shapes and skins are created and put on sale by the owners.
The incentive to create such things is diminished if the owner cannot control re-use or
modification. Such control can be motivated by emotional satisfaction as much as a desire to
make money.
But Second Life uses technology to vest the creator with a near-absolute intellectualproperty right that the physical world can only crudely duplicate through such tactics as
copyrights and patents. Physical-world enforcement of intellectual-property rights generally
involves uncertainty over such questions as whether an invention is truly novel, or whether fair
use should govern the reproduction of a book excerpt. Such questions often create expensive
litigation, and new technology generates new issues that may take years to resolve in the courts,
creating delay that may retard innovation further. But Linden Labs has used technology to create
a near-perfect property right for objects, songs, and other creations, with the only limitation
being the ability of other residents to circumvent the Second Life code that allows creators to set
the rules for use of their creations. This means that Linden Labs itself generates the property
right, which is defined, without the need of courts or cease-and-desist letters, in near-absolute
terms. If a creator wishes to use someone else’s creation as the raw material for his own, he
simply negotiates an agreement with the owner, pays the agreed-upon price and then has
complete access to it. Intellectual property in Second Life (with the exception of the prohibition
on taking creations out of Second Life into another virtual world) duplicates the theoretical ideal
of economic models of intellectual property, and thus maximizes the creativity that physicalworld laws can only imperfectly promote. This is unsurprising, given that the monopoly costs of
intellectual-property rights are lower in an environment such as Second Life, assuming that
consumers desire variety and that the creation of variety is easy.
Transparency
UD activities are still costly, although they are a negative side effect of an activity that
may be on balance beneficial. How are they to be policed? Transparency is the key
requirement. Transparency here refers to the ease with which users can obtain information,
financial and otherwise, about the partners they contemplate doing business with. In physical
space this is accomplished through both public and private means. The former include such
reporting and monitoring agencies as the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as the
policing of fraud. The latter includes such devices as standards set by the accounting industry
and groups, such as Consumers Union, that test products for reliability. Virtual worlds should
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make it easy for any user to access the history and reputation of any commercial enterprise,
perhaps through such tactics as establishing (or importing from physical space) accounting
standards that its enterprises must adhere to and make readily accessible, or allowing (and
making easy) the creation of ratings from other enterprise customers. Since users will be able to
create on their own a wide variety of assessment or vetting methods for virtual businesses, the
world’s owners need only not to prohibit the creation and use of such methods. We predict,
because of the ease of search in virtual space, that the development of such ratings systems will
become a common feature of virtual worlds, and perhaps even a substantial money-making
opportunity in its own right.
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